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Standard models of soft budget constraints consider bailouts as pure
monetary transfers. However, in practice often additional obligations or
restrictions, such as savings goals, are linked to monetary bailouts. This
paper analyzes in a model of a federation if such restrictions change eco-
nomic outcomes in an soft budget constraint environment and under what
circumstances they can increase welfare as compared to pure soft budget
and hard budget regimes. We ￿nd that restrictions generally harden budget
constraints, but not necessarily increase welfare. The evaluation crucially
depends on the tax endowment of the central government and on the shape
of preferences.
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Over the past decade, the soft budget constraint (SBC) phenomenon received a
growing attention by public economists. At the heart of this phenomenon there
is a lack of commitment of a supporting organization to keep the receiver of the
support to an ex-ante agreed budget. In federations this is typically a higher level
government such as a central government bailing out lower level governments such
as states or municipalities with extraordinary grants to prevent them from the
consequences of a ￿scal crisis.
One important cause for the lack of commitment are the similar preferences
of the supporting and the receiving organization. Consider for example a state
in a federation which is not able to provide important public services such as
schooling or tap water due to a debt crisis. In such a situation, it would not only
bene￿t the inhabitants of the debt-ridden state to receive a bailout, but also the
central government to give a bailout since it cares for all inhabitants, also the ones
su⁄ering from shortage in the jurisdiction in ￿scal crisis. The motives for such
interventions may be of di⁄erent nature, for instance the maintenance of public
services producing positive bene￿t spillovers to other regions (Wildasin, 1997) or
the pursuit of receiving votes (Goodspeed, 2002).
Theoretical papers on the soft budget syndrome usually model bailouts in
the form of monetary transfers. For instance, Wildasin (1997) as well as Criv-
elli and Staal (2006) use matching grants, Quian and Roland (1998) as well as
Besfamille and Lockwood (2007) use project re￿nance and Goodspeed (2002) as
well as BreuillØ, MadiŁs and Taugourdeau (2007) use unconditional grants.
However, in practice one can often observe bailouts in federations which are
1linked to additional obligations, requirements or restrictions such as savings goals.
For example, in response to a series of municipal defaults during the depression in
Canada, the Ontario Municipal Board was founded in 1932 and a few years later
the Department of Municipal A⁄airs in 1934 as well as the Windsor Finance Com-
mission in 1935 . These boards restricted the actions of defaulting municipalities
by measures like prescribing refunding plans, auditing, inspecting, approving and
supervising municipal budgets or even controlling certain expenditures (Bird and
Tassonyi, 2003). Another example are adjustment targets which were formulated
1997 in Law 9496 as a condition for debt relief for the Brazilian states. These
targets included for instance scheduled declines in debt-revenue ratios, limits on
personnel spending or ceilings on investments (Rodden, 2003). Certainly one of
the most famous examples is the Emergency Financial Control Board which con-
trolled New York City during the bailout following the 1975 debt crisis. The board
could control and reject the city￿ s ￿nancial planning, current and capital budgets,
negotiated wage contracts as well as local borrowing. If the city had not met the
requirements, the EFCB would have had the right to control all municipal accounts
and to exercise disciplinary sanctions (Eichhorst and Kaiser, 2006).
In contrast to pure monetary payments that are ex-post bene￿cial from both the
donors and the recipients perspective, additional obligations involve countervailing
preferences. It seems reasonable that a central government providing ￿nancial
assistance might prefer a high tax rate in the recipient region in order to enforce a
contribution to the resolution of the crisis, while the region is likely to prefer low
taxes and ￿nancing the de￿cit out of central government funds. The countervailing
nature of preferences renders such restrictions a credible device for the central
government to make bailouts less attractive from the perspective of the region and
2may therefore alleviate the soft budget constraint problem.
In our paper, we investigate the e⁄ects of restrictions in the form of prescribed
tax rates and expenditure savings imposed in conjunction with monetary bailouts
on regional incentives, the softness of budget constraints and welfare. In line with
the theoretical literature on soft budget constraints (for an literature overview
see Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003), we ￿nd that e⁄ort of regions to provide
the regional public good is too low in presence of positive bailout expectations.
In contrast, regions spend too high e⁄ort under a pure hard budget regime, a
result, which has recently been derived by Besfamille and Lockwood (2007). The
contribution of our paper is to explicitly consider additonal obligations which the
region has to ful￿ll in case of accepting a monetary bailout. We consider a model,
where regions can raise revenues through two di⁄erent channels - collecting taxes or
saving expenditures. We show if the central government can fully restrict regional
actions, i.e. prescribe both, a tax rate and an the amount of expenditure savings,
the ￿rst best can be implemented. We refer to this setting as fully restricted bailout
regime. Surprisingly, in a partly restricted bailout regime, where restrictions are just
allowed in one dimension, e.g. on the tax rate, welfare might be even lower than
in an unrestricted bailout regime. The intuition for this result is that the regions
compensate for the restriction by distorting the unrestricted revenue instrument
even more than in case of no restrictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a overview
of the related literature. Section 3 presents the basic model set-up and section 4
introduces three benchmark cases: Centralized decision making as a benchmark for
the ￿rst best (FB) solution, the hard budget constraint (HBC) and an unrestricted
bailout (UB) regime. Section 5 presents the results of the fully (FRB) and the
3partly restricted bailout (PB) regimes. All cases are evaluated with regard to their
welfare in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on the soft budget constraint problem, a phe-
nomenon initially analyzed by Kornai (1979, 1980) in the context of socialist en-
terprises which got de￿cits covered by the state. The concept has afterwards been
applied to a variety of other ￿elds, for instance banks (most prominently Maskin
and Dewatripont, 1995), social insurance institutions in transition economies (e.g.
Kornai and Eggleston, 2001) or as in our paper to decentralized countries. A com-
prehensive overview on the soft budget constraint literature is provided by Kornai,
Maskin and Roland (2003).
Within this literature, we are close to recent work dealing with the question of
how di⁄erent institutions and characteristics of federations a⁄ect regional choice
and the softness of budget constraints? With this in mind, Quian and Roland
(1998) as well as BreuillØ, MadiŁs and Taugourdeau (2006) investigate the e⁄ects
of tax competition, Wildasin (1997) as well as Crivelli and Staal (2006) consider the
size of regions, BreuillØ, MadiŁs and Taugourdeau (2007) the type of spending and
Akai and Sato (2005) the type of authority which is allocated to local governments.
Our paper deals with the role of tax and expenditure restrictions as well as the
availability of a transfer system.
In addition, because we investigate three di⁄erent "second best" regimes (unre-
stricted bailout, partial bailout and hard budget constraints), we conduct a welfare
analysis in a separate section. One part of the results in this section is closely
4related to the recent ￿ndings of Besfamille and Lockwood (2007), who pioneer
the view that not only soft budget constraints but also hard budget constraints
involve ine¢ ciencies. Unlike in our model, Besfamille and Lockwood use a frame-
work, based on a project ￿nance approach similar to that of Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995). However, similar to our model, they ￿nd parameter values, for
which either second best regime may dominate or even be e¢ cient.
Our model assumptions basically follow standard approaches of modelling soft
budget problems in federations. Like most papers, we create the commitment
through a two-stage game where regions are allowed to move ￿rst. Some authors
divide the two stages additionally in two periods (e.g. Goodspeed, 2001) or BreuillØ
et al., 2006). However, we employ similar to Wildasin (1997) or Crivelli and Staal
(2006) just one period. The bailout motive of the central government emerges
simply from maximization of joint utility of all regions, which is also standard.
Sometimes, unlike in our paper, bailouts are also motivated by bene￿t spillovers
(e.g. in Wildasin, 1997).
Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize two assumptions which di⁄er from
standard approaches and are important for our results. First, we do not re￿nance
the bailouts through ex-post central government taxation. We instead allocate a
￿xed budget ex-ante to the central government, which can in turn decide to spend
it ex-post on a national public good or on bailouts. This assumption is a simple way
to endow the central government with tax revenue. At the same time it is su¢ cient
to create a commitment problem. BreuillØ et. al (2007) explicitly compare the
e⁄ects of an ex-post manipulatable with an ex-post non-manuipulatable head tax
and ￿nd that in the latter case the central government is still inclined to increase
the ex-post transfer above the e¢ cient level, but to a lesser extent than with a
5manipulable tax.
The second particularity of our setup is that, regions have two decision vari-
ables. The second decision variable allows us to see if additional bailout require-
ments are still valuable from a welfare perspective if central governments are able
to restrict regional actions only in some areas but not in others. This setting is
important, because regions in federations are generally endowed with autonomous
rights to determine expenditures and revenues, which are as a rule cannot easily
be taken away, also in extraordinary situations like debt crises. We consider par-
ticularly the situation where the central government is allowed to require a certain
tax rate, but leaves expenditure autonomy to the region. But this setting can be
interpreted more generally as one restricted and another unrestricted policy ￿eld.
3 Model Set-Up
We consider a simple model of a federation with a central government and two
regional governments (i = 1;2). Regions are inhabited by representative con-
sumers, deriving utility from private consumption ci, regional public consump-
tion gi and national public consumption G according to the additively separa-
ble utility function u(ci) + h(gi) + J (G) which exhibits standard properties (i.e.
u0;h0;J0 > 0;u00;h00;J00 < 0; monotonicity, continuous di⁄erentiability in all argu-
ments) and Inada conditions u0 (1);h0 (1);J0 (1) = 0.
The central government is assumed to receive ex-ante an exogenously ￿xed
amount of tax revenue T, which it can spend either on the national public good
or on grants (transfers or bailouts) to regional governments zi ￿ 0:
6T = G + zi + zj (1)
Representative consumers are endowed (after central government taxation)
with identical income w < 1, which can be interpreted as income after revenue
equalization. Regional governments may tax this income at a proportional rate
ti ￿ 0. The income after regional taxation is spent on private consumption.
ci = w(1 ￿ ti) (2)
Regional governments can not only obtain revenue through regional taxation
and central government grants but also through exerting e⁄ort ai ￿ 0 on saving
expenditures. Examples for such e⁄ort could be the closure of schools loosing at-
tendance and distributing the pupils on other schools; or procurement of a software
simplifying the administration of a public task, such that less personnel is needed
to ful￿ll it. We assume that the e⁄ort is translated linearly into revenue for the
regional public good. So, regional consumption is ￿nanced through three sources.
gi = wti + ai + zi (3)
The e⁄ort spent on e¢ ciency enhancements is assumed to cause convex e⁄ort
costs k (ai), k0 (ai) > 0;k00 (ai) > 0 8 ai ￿ 0 which diminish the payo⁄ from public
and private consumption. These costs can be interpreted as transaction costs, e.g.
search costs or administration costs.
In all settings the timing is such that regions choose in the ￿rst stage all unre-
stricted variables by maximizing the utility of the representative consumer in their
7own region. In the second stage the central government chooses all remaining
variables by maximizing the utility of both regions. This sequence of decisions is
a standard approach to model non-commitment of the lastly moving agent.
4 Benchmark Cases
We consider three benchmark cases: the ￿rst best regime as a benchmark for
e¢ ciency, the hard budget regime because it de￿nes the outside option for the
region if it denies the bailout and the unrestricted bailout regime as a benchmark
for a pure monetary bailout without any further restrictions.
4.1 Centralized Decision Making




[u(ci) + h(gi) + J (G) ￿ k (ai)] (4)
s.t. (1), (2) and (3).
The solution is characterized by conditions (5) ￿ (7).
u
0 (ci) = h
0 (gi) 8i (5)
k
0 (ai) = h
0 (gi) 8i (6)
1Where t denotes (t1;t2); a denotes (a1;a2) and z, (z1;z2):
82J
0 (G) = h
0 (gi) 8i (7)
The ￿rst two conditions express that in the e¢ cient solution marginal costs
of taxation (i.e. forgone private consumption) and of e⁄ort are equalized to their
marginal bene￿ts, i.e. additional regional public consumption. The last condition
is a Samuelson type condition which shows that the bene￿t from allowing one
unit of transfer has to compensate for forgone national public consumption in
both regions. Because we are interested in the soft budget constraint problem, we
assume throughout that zi > 0 is optimal and that the parameter constellations
are such that ai > 0 and ti > 0;8i. If to the contrary 2J0 (G) > h0 (gi) at zi = 0, no
bailout is optimal. Finally, the symmetry assumptions imply that ti = tj;ai = aj
and zi = zj; 8i 6= j, which holds as well for all cases discussed below.
4.2 Hard Budget Constraint Regime
We de￿ne the hard budget constraint (HBC) regime as a regime where transfers
are not available. This case is important because it de￿nes the outside option of
a region, i.e. the utility a region can obtain by denying any central government
assistance and resolving the ￿scal crisis on its own. The solution of the HBC
problem is characterized by conditions (5) and (6) resulting from problem (4) in
the absence of transfers.2 Because, we focus on cases where 8i : zFB
i > 0 (FB
stands for ￿rst best), the HBC regime is ine¢ cient. The following proposition
describes the nature of these ine¢ ciencies:
2Please note that the solutions to the regional government problem and the central govern-
ment problem coincide in the absence of transfers.
9Proposition 1 Provided zFB
i > 0, regions choose tax rates and e⁄ort levels too





i . Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Regions have to compensate
for central government bailouts by higher regional revenue contributions to the
resolution of the crisis.
4.3 Unrestricted Bailout Regime
The unrestricted bailout (UB) regime is the standard pure SBC case. In this
setting, the central government has only the instrument of monetary grants at its
disposal and can not commit to an e¢ cient level of grants. Non-commitment is
modeled through timing. Regions move ￿rst by choosing tax rates and e⁄ort levels
and the central government moves last by determining transfer policy. We solve
the game by backward induction.
The central government maximizes at stage two the utility of the residents
in both regions by choosing grants taking tax rate and e⁄ort choices of regions
as given. The solution is characterized by condition (7), from which we obtain

















As in standard models, the central government responds to tax rate and e⁄ort
10reductions in region i with an increase of the grant to this region, whereas the
grant of the other region is reduced.
Regional governments maximize at stage one just the utility of their own resi-
dents s.t. (1) ￿ (3) by taking central government behavior into account.
u
0 (ci) = 1
2h
0 (gi) 8i (8)
k
0 (ai) = 1
2h
0 (gi) 8i (9)
The solution to this problem, summarized in conditions (8) and (9), clearly
di⁄ers from the e¢ cient solution in (5) and (6). The reason is that each region
does not consider the e⁄ects of own tax setting and expenditure behavior on public
consumption in other regions. Particularly in the case of two regions only half of
the bene￿ts of marginal increases of tax rates and e⁄ort levels are considered. How
does this a⁄ect regional decisions?
Proposition 2 Provided zFB
i > 0, regions choose tax rates and e⁄ort levels too





i . Proof: see Appendix.
We can infer in addition from
@gi
@ai > 0 and
@gi
@ti > 03, that regional public
consumption is ine¢ ciently low gUB
i < gFB
i , which holds as well for national public
















11The result shows not only that regions reduce their e⁄ort below an e¢ cient
level as in standard models of soft budget constraints, but also that ex-ante and
ex-post grants di⁄er. The nature of these di⁄erences has been extensively discussed
in Koethenbuerger (2007) for corrective (or Pigouvian) subsidies. In our case, the
di⁄erence illustrates that the ex-ante e¢ cient grant zFB
i is not credible, because
if regions reduce tax rates and e⁄ort to the ine¢ cient levels tUB
i and aUB
i , it is
optimal for the central government to increase the grant in turn to the amount
zUB
i . In case of commitment the response should be zero. In the next section, we
turn to the question if additional bailout restrictions can alleviate the commitment
problem.
5 Restricted Bailout Regimes
In this section, we explicitly consider additional obligations or restrictions in con-
junction with monetary bailouts. The way we model the obligations resembles a
procedure of budgetary approval during a crisis. In practice, regions can typically
prepare a budget plan, which is rejected whenever it does not meet the objectives
of the monitoring agency. However, from a game theoretic perspective this is the
same as if the agency or the central government could choose the restricted vari-
able directly without initial proposal of the region. Therefore we let regions choose
only the unrestricted choice variables at stage 1 and the central government all
remaining variables at stage 2.
At the same time the central government is also restricted in its actions, because
regions could always reject any help and resolve the crisis themselves. In this
case, they would obtain the HBC utility. In order to ensure commitment to the
12additional bailout restrictions, we assume a constitutional law which endows the
central government with rights to prescribe regional tax rates and/or expenditure
savings onto the central government whenever monetary grants are paid. This rule
is important, because otherwise regions could reject the bailout and we were back
in the unrestricted bailout case.4
5.1 Fully Restricted Bailout Regime
In this regime, regions receive not only a transfer, but also have to adhere to tax
rates and e⁄ort levels prescribed by the central government, whenever they accept








at stage 2. Because there is no leeway for regions
to change anything about this o⁄er at stage 1, we leave out this stage and let














.5 The next proposition holds because the ￿rst best o⁄er,
although being less attractive from the regional perspective than the allocation in
an unrestricted regime, is still more attractive than the HBC allocation and will
therefore be accepted.
Proposition 3 The fully restricted bailout regime implements the ￿rst best allo-
cation. Proof: see Appendix.
4This is also the reason why we refer to restrictions and not to conditions. Conditions in the
fashion of "When you choose tax rate x and e⁄ort level y, then you get a grant of size z" are not
credible.
5We consider only symmetric equilibria. In principle, asymmetric equilibria (one region
accepts and the other rejects) are also possible, but only if we are in solutions where the central
government is su¢ ciently poor. We rule this out by assuming that the central government is rich
enough to provide further funds after one region has already accepted the bailout.
13Because of the alignment of preferences, the central government would not pro-
pose any o⁄er that is harmful to the regions because this would harm as well itself.
On the other hand, the restrictions prevent regions from moving to their most pre-
ferred allocation, i.e. to the low tax rates and e⁄ort levels of an unrestricted
regime.
5.2 Partially Restricted Bailout Regime
In the partially restricted bailout (PB) game, regions keep at least some auton-
omy and can choose e⁄ort levels at stage 1, while the central government chooses
tax rates and transfers at stage 2, if the bailout is accepted.6 Alternatively re-
gions could again reject the bailout. We ￿rst solve the two stage game and check
afterwards if bailout acceptance is bene￿cial from the perspective of regions.
The central government maximizes at stage 2 the utility of all residents s.t. all
budget constraints (1) ￿ (3) and taking regional e⁄ort choices as given. Implicit
di⁄erentiation of conditions (5) and (7), which characterize the tax and transfer
















Similar to the unrestricted bailout case, reduced e⁄ort in region i elicits larger
transfers to this region, but decreases transfers to the other region. In addition,
6The case on partial restrictions on e⁄ort, but not on taxes produces similar results, just
that e⁄ort and taxation are interchanged.
14tax rates are raised to compensate for the lower e⁄ort. Taking all e⁄ects into









Regional governments, taking this central government policy into account max-
imize the utility of their own residents s.t. (1) ￿ (3) at stage 1. Optimal e⁄ort
choices are as in the unrestricted bailout case characterized by condition (9). How
does this sequence of decisions a⁄ect equilibrium e⁄ort and tax rates?
Proposition 4 Provided zFB
i > 0; in the partially restricted bailout regime, e⁄ort
levels are even lower than in the unrestricted bailout regime and tax rates are




i . Proof (including optimality
of acceptance): See appendix.
The downward distortion of the e⁄ort level is generally driven by the short-
sightedness of the region regarding the bene￿ts of spending e⁄ort. It neglects the
positive e⁄ects for the other region. But why is e⁄ort even lower than in the un-
restricted case? To understand this, suppose the region had chosen aUB
i . This is
too low from the perspective of the central government and it therefore increases
the regional tax rate above the ￿rst best level and hence as well above the level
preferred by the region tUB
i . This reduces c.p. the marginal bene￿t of public con-
sumption gi and since tax rates and e⁄ort are substitute instruments for raising
revenue, the region compensates for the higher tax rates by further reducing its
e⁄ort level.
Corollary 5 : In comparison to the unrestricted regime, in the partially restricted















. Proof: See appendix.
The reduction of transfers is a result of the increased scope of the central gov-
ernment. Compared to the unrestricted bailout case it has one more instrument at
its disposal to resolve the regional crisis. The utilization of the second instrument,
i.e. regional taxation, allows the central government to reduce transfers zi. In
e⁄ect, the central government can force the region to participate in the resolution
of the crisis through taxation and therefore to into the provision of a higher level
of public goods before transfers, which entails a higher public good provision after
transfers. This is one central result of the paper.
However, it remains an open question, if this regime yields higher welfare than
an unrestricted bailout regime? Compared to the latter, in the partially restricted
bailout regime regional as well as national public consumption are increased and
e⁄ort costs are reduced, but private consumption is lower. So it is not possible to
make an outright statement. We move on to this issue in the next section.
6 Welfare Analysis
Throughout the paper, we deal with three di⁄erent kinds of ine¢ cient regimes
- the unrestricted bailout regime, the partially restricted bailout regime and the
hard budget constraint regime. Although the central government can not credibly
commit to a HBC regime in our two stage model, it is nevertheless important to
make a welfare statement about this regime since it involves a distinctly di⁄erent
type of ine¢ ciency than the UB and the PB regime. The latter both are ine¢ cient
for their soft budget constraints, i.e. the possibility for regional governments to
16increase the size of their budgets through their actions, which produces ine¢ ciently
low contributions of regions to the resolution of the crisis. In contrast, the HBC
regime involves no transfer at all, which renders the contributions of the central
government too low and enforces thereby ine¢ ciently high e⁄ort of regions.
We show in the sequel, that it is not possible to make general statements about
the welfare ranking of the three regimes. Depending on the wealth of the central
government and on preferences, either regime may dominate. We proceed in two
steps. First, we compare the HBC regime with both SBC regimes (UB, PB) and
show that the welfare evaluation depends on the tax endowment of the central
government. We show, if the endowment is low, all regimes are e¢ cient. For
intermediate values, the UB and PB regimes are dominated by the HBC regime
and vice versa for high values of central government endowments. In the second
part of the section, we use the example of a logarithmic function to show that either
the UB or the PB regime may dominate depending on the shape of preferences.
In our example, the PB regime dominates, if the valuation of public consumption
is su¢ ciently high, while the UB regime dominates if e⁄ort costs are su¢ ciently
small.
6.1 E¢ ciency of HBC versus SBC Regimes
The evaluation of hard budget regimes as opposed to soft budget regimes depends
on the tax endowment of the central government T relative to the regional wealth
endowment w: Because reductions of w and increases of T have qualitatively similar
e⁄ects, we ￿x w and analyze changes of T:
To establish our main argument, we ￿rst de￿ne two threshold values of central
17government tax revenue T and T. T is the value where the central government
just starts to employ transfers as a ￿nancing instrument for regional public goods
in ￿rst best, i.e. the value of T at which all e¢ ciency conditions (5)￿(7) are met
for zi = 0: On the other hand T > T de￿nes the level of tax revenue in the ￿rst
best regime at which the central government becomes so rich that it prefers to
￿nance regional public consumption completely out of transfers (gi = zi > 0) and
stops to use both regional taxation as well as expenditure savings as a revenue
raising instrument, i.e. u0 (w) ￿ h0 (gi);k0 (0) ￿ h0 (gi).7
Proposition 5 and the ￿gure 1 summarize how welfare evolves in the di⁄erent
regimes across di⁄erent levels of central government tax revenue.
Proposition 6 The HBC regime is e¢ cient for all T ￿ T and ine¢ cient for all
T > T: SBC regimes are e¢ cient for T < T as well as T ￿ T and ine¢ cient for
T ￿ T < T: Proof: see Appendix.
7The existence of T is assured by the Inada conditions on public and private consumption
J0 (1);h0 (1);u0 (1) = 0; the ￿niteness of regional wealth w < 0 and hence u0 (w) > 0 as well
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Figure 1: SBC vs. HBC regimes
For T < T all regimes are e¢ cient (fat line) because bailout costs (marginal
costs of forgoing one unit of national public consumption) costs are very high.
In this interval, on the one hand the HBC regime (slim line) entails no welfare
losses since a no-bailout policy is even optimal in ￿rst best and the availability of
transfers adds no value. On the other hand, the SBC regimes (dashed line) are
e¢ cient because high bailout costs allow the central government to commit to the
no-bailout policy and incentives to raise revenue stay undistorted.
At T = T the SBC regimes become ine¢ cient because marginal deviations from
￿rst best policy start to pay o⁄ and regions switch into the SBC equilibrium. On
the other hand the ine¢ ciency of the HBC regime appears as well, but increases
only gradually as T rises above T: This is due to a gradual replacement of regional
taxation and e⁄ort by transfers in ￿rst best, whereas tax rates and e⁄ort are kept
constant in the HBC regime.
At T = T regional taxation and e⁄ort are completely phased out as revenue
19raising instruments in ￿rst best, and hence also in the SBC regimes. Given that in-
e¢ ciencies from too low taxation or e⁄ort cannot occur anymore, the SBC regimes
coincide with ￿rst best for all T ￿ T.
Besfamille and Lockwood (2007) derive similar results in a project ￿nance
framework depending on e⁄ort costs for increasing the bene￿t of a project and
re￿nancing (or bailout) costs. They ￿nd, when the e⁄ort costs are very low, both
the HBC and the SBC regime are e¢ cient. In contrast, the HBC regime dominates
with intermediate e⁄ort and re￿nancing (or bailout) costs, while at high e⁄ort costs
and su¢ ciently low re￿nancing costs this is true for the SBC regime.
6.2 E¢ ciency of PB vs. UB regimes
In this section, we show that contrary to our initial expectation, the partially
restricted bailout regime does not generally dominate the unrestricted bailout
regime. This ￿nding is surprising because in the PB regime the central government
has an additional instrument at its disposal and budget constraints are hardened
compared to the unrestricted regime. We employ a Cobb-Douglas type logarithmic






(￿lnci + ￿ lngi + ￿ ln(L ￿ ai) + ￿ lnG) ￿ 2 (PB;UB)
(10)
Where ￿;￿;￿;￿ > 0 are weighting factors adding up to one: ￿+￿+￿+￿ =
1 and L is a constant. To facilitate understanding, one could interpret L as time
endowment, ai as time spent on searching and implementing measures for leaning
public administration and L ￿ ai as leisure time.







2￿ + ￿ + 2￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿ + 2￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ln2 (11)
This di⁄erence is independent of wealth, tax and time endowments (w;T;L).
We investigate for which combinations of ￿;￿;￿ and ￿ either the UB or the PB
regime dominates. We ￿rst state our result and explain the intuition afterwards.
Proposition 7 If the joint valuation of public goods (￿ + ￿) is su¢ ciently high,





, the PB regime at least weakly dominates the UB regime.
On the other hand, the UB regime at least weakly dominates the PB Regime if the
joint valuation of public and private consumption (￿ + ￿ + ￿) is su¢ ciently small,





: Proof: see appendix.
The interesting ￿nding of this proposition is that the PB regime might be
inferior to the UB regime although the central government has a second instrument
at its disposal. Because of the multiplicity of parameters and utility components,
the welfare evaluation of the results is complex. Two important sources are driving
the explanation. Firstly, a shift of weight from one to another parameter causes
a "weighting e⁄ect", meaning that a given distortion enters more heavily into the
welfare function. Since in the PB regime e⁄ort choices are more stongly distorted
than in the UB regime, an increase of ￿ detoriaties the welfare of the PB relative
to UB the regime. In the same manner, an increase of the weighting factors for
regional and national public consumption (￿;￿), that are more heavily distorted
8A summary of results for this utility function can be found in the appendix.
21in the UB regime, relatively improve the evaluation of PB. The e⁄ects of ￿ are
ambiguous and depend on the remaining parameters.
The second element of the welfare evaluation is an "incentive e⁄ect", deter-
mining the the size of distortions in the PB relative to the UB regime. In the UB
regime the distortion from ￿rst best is largest when the joint weight on forgone
public consumption (￿ + ￿) takes intermediate values, while for very low and very
high values the distortion is small. The intuition for this result is that a low impor-
tance of public consumption entails low provision of public consumption in ￿rst
best. However, marginal reductions from initially high amounts are extremely
costly due to sharply increasing marginal costs of public consumption. On the
other hand, for high values of (￿ + ￿) marginal costs of downward deviations are
virtually constant, while the bene￿ts of additional consumption and leisure, be-
ing already low in ￿rst best for low (￿ + ￿); are sharply decreasing. Only for
intermediate values it pays o⁄to signi￿cantly deviate from ￿rst best choices. Sim-
ilarly, in the PB regime, incentives to deviate from FB are maximized when ￿ and
(￿ + ￿ + ￿), respectively take intermediate values. This explains the result.
For low values of ￿, both the "incentive e⁄ect" to distort in the PB regime and
the "weighting e⁄ect" of this distortion is low. Given ￿ is low, a su¢ ciently high
value of (￿ + ￿) entails a high "incentive e⁄ect" multiplied by a high "weighting
e⁄ect" for the UB regime, yielding a clear domination of PB. As ￿ increases,
(￿ + ￿) do necessarily decrease as all weights sum up to one. At the critical value
of ￿ ￿ 1
ln2, the distortions in the PB regime become dominant. They decrease
as ￿ rises further because the "incentive e⁄ect" stops to grow and begins to fall,
while the continuing rise of the "weighting e⁄ect" dominates and maintains the
dominance of the UB regime until ￿ approaches one.
227 Conclusion
The main question of this paper is, if the soft budget constraint problem can
be alleviated if additional obligations or restrictions are available? Our analysis
shows, this is not necessarily the case. Constraints, even if they are credible, are
not always welfare enhancing. If the scope of the central government is limited
and it can require certain actions from regions just in one policy area but not
in others, the outcome may be even worse than in an unrestricted regime. The
intuition for this ￿nding is that a region which is regulated in one area, e.g. by
minimum tax requirements, may substitute very strongly by reduced employment
of other revenue collection instruments, such as e⁄ort on cutting expenditures. In
contrast, a fully restricted regime implements the ￿rst best outcome in our model.
Thus, from a policy perspective the paper suggests that a comprehensive ap-
proach is a more promising path to reconcile the aims of helping a debt ridden
jurisdiction and enforcing a su¢ ciently high contribution of the region to the re-
duction of debt. Single empirical cases support this hypothesis. For example, the
quick resolution of the 1975 New York ￿scal crisis, under the strict surveillance
of the cities budgetary performance by the EFCB and the contrasting experience
with the German city of Bremen, which received a total bailout of 8.5 bn e over
the period 1994-2004, virtually without further obligations and nevertheless in-
creased its debt from 8.8 bn e to 11.4 bn e. However, it is an important task for
future research to test the hypotheses derived in the paper on a sound empirical
basis.
From a theoretical perspective the analysis shows that not each policy, which
hardens budget constraints, in the sense that less transfers are paid, is welfare
23enhancing. This holds not only for the partial bailout regime, but also for the hard
budget constraint regime, which just addresses the problem of preventing regions
from deviating downwards, while completely ignoring the bene￿ts of helping the
region out of the crisis.
In addition, the welfare analysis identi￿es the budget size of the central govern-
ment as a determinant of the evaluation of di⁄erent regimes. This ￿nding might
explain di⁄erent attitudes of federal governments towards soft budget constraints.
The model predicts that governments of more decentralized countries with a small
role of the federal level should be in favor of hard budget regimes, whereas govern-
ments of more centralized countries with a larger federal budgets should be more
likely to prefer soft budget regimes. Similarly, developments of revenues over the
business-cycle increasing or reducing the relative size of the federal budget may
in￿ uence the judgement of the central government. But this is again an interesting
empirical question.
Finally, it should be pointed out that restrictions during a bailout can of course
not make up for ￿scally imprudent behavior before the bailout takes place. In this
sense, the paper discusses the optimal policy once the crisis is at hand and adds
to the literature on budget rules by providing theoretical arguments on using such
rules during ￿scal crises.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We next show that if zFB
























= h0 (gi)￿k0 (ai) > 0; meaning
that it pays to deviate upwards in both the tax and the e⁄ort dimensions, which
provides the contradiction.
26In addition equalization of marginal bene￿ts of consumption and marginal ef-
fort costs (u0 (ci) = k0 (ai)) in both the HBC and the FB regimes insures that
upwards deviation occurs in both dimensions.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2































= ￿wu0 (ci) + w
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h0 (gi) ￿ k0 (ai) < 0, i.e.
downward deviation increases regional utility. Again the equality of marginal e⁄ort
costs and marginal utility from private consumption (u0 (ci) = k0 (ai)), both in the
￿rst best and in the soft budget regimes excludes solutions where one variable
deviates upwards, while the other deviates downwards.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We show that given zFB
i > 0 8i, the central government o⁄er is more valuable








; where a denotes the
vector (a1;a2);t = (t1;t2) and z =(z1;z2): We proceed in two steps:
(1) Part I of the proof shows, if transfers are paid in ￿rst best zFB
i > 0;
then it is as well optimal to pay transfers at the higher tax rate tHBC
i and the






> 0, where the ￿ indicates the
optimal central government policy for a given vector of regional choices. To see




= 0: Then the HBC solution would





















￿ 2J0 (wG): But if this was true, then zFB
i = 0. The cen-
tral government condition for transfers: h0 (gi) > 2J0 (G) assures in addition that
regional utility would be raised if the region could obtain the grant zHBC
i .















: The ￿rst and
second order conditions9 of the SBC problem imply 8 ti > tUB
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h0 (gi) ￿ k0 (ai) < 0.













8.4 Proof of Proposition 4




i . We proof the proposition in
two steps and in a third step that acceptance is optimal. De￿ne t￿
i (a);z￿
i (a) as

























































@ti = w2 ￿

































































i , contradicting our initial statement.
(3) Acceptance of the partially restricted bailout is more valuable from the
perspective of the region than resolving the crisis alone.





i.e. the central government would give a transfer if the regions chose
￿
aHBC;tHBC￿
in the unrestricted regime and the acceptance of this grant would increase the util-














the central government could choose ti and zi freely, it would prefer by the cen-





















. A move to this (zi;ti) combination would
be again utility enhancing from the perspective of the regions, because the central
government would reduce ti only as long as u0 (ci) ￿ h0 (gi) and increase zi only as















































which establishes the result that acceptance is indeed optimal.


























298.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We denote in the following U
￿
CG (z;t;a) as the utility of the central government in
regime ￿ 2 (FB;UB;PB;HBC). We proceed in four steps.
(1) For T ￿ T, the ￿rst order conditions of the HBC regime coincide with
the FB regime.
(2) Di⁄erentiation of the utility di⁄erence between the ￿rst best and the
HBC regime for T > T, shows that the HBC regime constantly deteriorates com-
pared to the e¢ cient solution as T increases. This can be illustrated by the deriv-










> 0 (note that GHBC = T and
GFB = T ￿ zFB
i ￿ zFB
j < T):





dai = 0 and marginal deviations from the ￿rst best policy do not







change from zero to positive values and marginal deviations from ￿rst best become
bene￿cial for regions. Furthermore, because regions distort their choices until their
optimality conditions ((8) and/or (9)) are met, there is a discrete utility di⁄erence
between SBC and FB at T = T.





dT = 0, whereas they depend negatively on T in all the remaining












dT > 0;￿ 2 (UB;PB;FB).
10We abstract from possible SBC equilibria below T because they just add complexity but
qualitatively do not change results.





































Notation: u ￿ u00 (c
￿
i);h ￿ h00 (g
￿
i);k ￿ k00 (a
￿
i);j ￿ J00 (G￿);￿ 2 (FB;PB;UB):
By proposition 2 it follows from aFB
i = 0 and tFB
i = 0; that aUB
i = 0 and
tUB
i = 0 and by proposition 4 aPB
i = 0, which proofs that PB and UB coincide
with FB if T ￿ T:
8.7 Summary of results for the logarithmic function









































8.8 Proof of Proposition 7





1. We substitute (￿ + ￿) by x = (￿ + ￿): In order to cover all possible cases,
we use two speci￿cations of ￿(￿;￿;￿;￿):
2. First we replace x, using the restriction of ￿ + ￿ + x = 1, by 1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) to






























Hence if ￿ > 1￿ln2
ln2 , the UB regime always dominates.
3. Second, we use again the restriction ￿ + ￿ + x = 1 to replace ￿ and to
obtain another speci￿cation of the utility di⁄erence, only depending on a and x :
￿(￿;x) = ln 2￿x
2￿x￿￿ ￿ ￿ln2: When is ￿(￿;x) positive, i.e. PB dominates?
ln 2￿x























Hence the PB regime dominates for all parameter constellations ful￿lling (￿ + ￿) >
2 ￿ 1
ln2.
4. The last possible speci￿cation of the utility di⁄erence, i.e. ￿(x;￿) does not
yield any additional insights and is therefore not considered.
5. To demonstrate, that there are solutions for both cases ful￿lling the parame-
ter constraints, we calculate two examples. As endowment parameters we choose:
L = 0:5 w = 0:1 wG = 0:4.
Example 1 ￿ > 0:44 (dominance of UB regime):
￿ = 0:13 ￿ = 0:2 ￿ = 0:47 ￿ = 0:2
UPB
CG ￿ UUB
CG ￿ ￿5:4 ￿ 10￿3 < 0 tUB
i ￿ 0:11 > 0 aPB
i ￿ 0:15 > 0:
Example 2 ￿ + ￿ > 0:56 (dominance of PB regime):
￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:3
UPB
CG ￿ UUB
CG ￿ 4:8 ￿ 10￿3 > 0 tUB
i ￿ 0:21 > 0 aPB
i ￿ 0:25 > 0:
32